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A common phenomenon that exists in any complex relationship between two countries is 
“linkage” across different policy issues. Linkage means to establish a relationship making 
progress in one area dependent on, or affecting progress in another area between the two 
countries. This thesis explores how linkage has evolved in the U.S.-China relationship across 
three different issue areas: currency, trade, and investment. The thesis argues that, as China‟s 
economy has grown more quickly relative to the United States economy, China has gained 
advantages in bargaining with the United States. Unlike linkage politics of the 1980s and 1990s, 
more recently, the United States has been less able to put the same pressure on China that it used 
to because China has been able to minimize linkages across different areas. In particular, China‟s 
participation in multilateral governance arrangements such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) shields it from direct pressure in the Sino-American bilateral relationship. In contrast, 
China has been able to make use of American vulnerabilities, particularly those arising from 
America‟s trade and budget deficits, to deflect pressure to make concessions on trade, 
investment, and currency issues. These three areas not only link with each other but also have 
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As of 2011, the United States has the world's largest economy and China the second 
largest. China has the world's largest population and the United States has the third largest. Sino-
American relations are increasingly complex nowadays. The United States and China are neither 
allies nor enemies, but competitors in some areas and partners in others. China and the U.S. are 
the world‟s largest mutual trading partners. China is also the largest foreign creditor for the 
United States. China and the United States are not only major trade partners, but also have 
common interests in many other fields, such as counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. 
The Sino-American relationship has become the world‟s most important bilateral relationship of 
the 21st century. 
A common phenomenon that exists in any complex relationship between two countries is 
“linkage” across different policy issues. Linkage means to establish a relationship making 
progress in one area dependent on, or affecting progress in another area between the two 
countries. For example, one country could use its economic advantage to affect trade relations 
with the other country, or a country could use its economic advantage to bargain over military 
issues with the other country. Linkage offers three advantages: First, countries could use the 
power that may be available in one policy domain to achieve cooperation in other domains from 
linkage. Second, linkage can be an important source of bilateral cooperation by allowing 
countries to bridge their differences through negotiation. Finally, by allowing countries to engage 
in cross-regime bargaining, linkage creates broader patterns of international cooperation (Perez 
2006). 
In Sino-American relations, both countries seek to establish or minimize linkage across 
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issues in order to improve their bargaining positions. For example, when the U.S. wants China to 
adjust its currency, the U.S. will seek to establish linkages between currency and trade policies in 
order to bargain with China. Thus, the threat of trade protectionism might pressure China to 
adjust the value of the Renminbi (RMB). In the same way, China could use some other issues, 
like Iran and North Korea, to minimize the attempt by its partner to assert linkages between 
currency and trade.  
This thesis explores how linkage has evolved in the U.S.-China relationship across three 
different issue areas: currency, trade, and investment. As China‟s economy has grown more 
quickly relative to the United States‟ economy, China has gained advantages in bargaining with 
the United States. Unlike linkage politics of the 1980s and 1990s, more recently, the United 
States has been less able to put the same pressure on China that it used to because China has 
been able to minimize linkages across different areas. In contrast, China has been able to make 
use of American vulnerabilities, particularly those arising from America‟s trade and budget 
deficits, to deflect pressure to make concessions on trade, investment, and currency issues. These 
three areas not only link with each other but also have linkage with some other non-economic 
areas in Sino-American relations. 
The first section of this thesis briefly introduces the Sino-American relationship. The 
second section of the thesis defines the concept of linkage, surveys earlier academic studies of 
linkage, and shows how it may be used to explain foreign policy choices. Then, the thesis looks 
at linkage within Sino-American currency relations, in particular, how the U.S. attempts to use 
linkage to put pressure on China‟s currency policy and how China attempts to deflect the 
pressure. The fourth section of the thesis looks at linkages between trade and some other issues 
in Sino-America relations. Next, the thesis considers the linkages between and across 
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investment, trade, and currency. Finally, the thesis examines linkages between economic and 
non-economic issues, such as the status of Taiwan, regional military security, counterterrorism, 
and human rights. 
 
II. Historical Background 
 
In the period immediately after World War II, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was 
isolated from the Western trading and financial system, and interacted much more frequently 
with the Soviet Union. China followed the Soviet model of urban-led industrialization, state 
ownership of the means of production, and central planning to build a new China. Because of 
Cold War hostilities, the United States did not recognize the PRC, and maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan instead. China‟s relations with U.S. were rendered even worse by the 
Korean War in 1950, which destroyed nearly all possibility for normal bilateral relations (Carter 
2001). 
In 1958, China instituted the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) to accelerate structural 
economic change and promote greater ideological purity. But the Great Leap Forward resulted in 
a great loss to China and the economy suffered. Although China‟s economy began to recover, it 
suffered another setback during the Culture Revolution (1966-1976). Both the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution left China technologically backward and politically 
isolated. As Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, China was diplomatically isolated as well. 
At this point, China began to repair relations and open its market to the West, especially the 
United States. At the same time, improving relations with China was also important for the 
American President, Nixon, in his election campaign. In 1969, the United States relaxed trade 
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restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact. In 1971, the young American ping pong 
player Glenn Cowan missed his US team bus but was waved by a Chinese table tennis player, 
Zhuang Zedong, onto the bus of the Chinese team and this led to the “Ping Pong Diplomacy” for 
Sino-American relations. The American athletes became the first Americans to officially visit 
China since 1949 (Marcus 2007). 
In 1972, this episode of Ping-Pong diplomacy led quickly to President Nixon‟s famous 
about-face regarding China. Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. Both U.S. and 
China issued the Shanghai Communiqué, setting the stage for the full normalization of 
diplomatic relations. In this Communiqué, the U.S. acknowledged that there is only one China 
and that Taiwan is part of China. In May 1973, the U.S. and China established the United States 
Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. In the Joint 
Communiqué signed in 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing and repeated the acknowledgment in the Shanghai Communiqué that there is only one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. On March 1, 1979, the United States and China 
established embassies in Beijing and Washington, DC. 
High-level exchanges have played a significant role in Sino-American relations during 
the last two decades of the 20
th
 century. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang 
exchanged visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian visited the United States, and the 
first President Bush visited China two times, once in October 1985 and again in February 1989. 
In 1997, Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited U.S. and President Clinton visited China in 1998. 
In 2009, President Obama visited China and Chinese President Hu Jintao visited U.S. in 2011. 
U.S. and China also established the high-level bilateral talks, the China-U.S. Strategic Economic 
Dialogue, in 2006. 
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In 1978, Deng Xiaoping implemented a policy of economic reform and opening to the 
outside world, and established four special economic zones for foreign investors. In particular, 
China abandoned its Soviet-style emphasis on heavy industry in favor of light industrial 
production for export. Chinese enterprises began to operate under market conditions. At the same 
time, China also depended on its diplomatic relations with the United States and other countries 
for its trade, investment, and economic development. China tried to dismantle many barriers to 
foreign companies and make a better environment for their business. U.S. and China promoted 
trade relations when they signed a trade agreement in 1979 that granted China Most-Favored-
Nation (MFN) trading status with the United States. This agreement reduced American tariffs on 
Chinese products and helped China to export more to the United States (Spero and Hart 2010). In 
2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows increased very quickly as more and more multinational corporations came into China. 
Nowadays, China‟s economy is the second largest in the world, just after the United 
States. With the success of its economy, China participates in globalization and plays an 
important role in many global initiatives. China also seeks to modernize its military, and develop 
advanced weapons (Lawrence and Lum 2011). As China has become a more important partner 
for America in the 21th century, the U.S. has broadened its cooperation with China over global 
and regional strategic problems, counterterrorism, and many other issues. China also cooperates 
with U.S. and learns from the U.S. in many issues, such as high technology and education.  
However, there are increasing frictions between the U.S. and China as well. For the 
United States, the main friction with China includes the RMB‟s value, the trade deficit, industrial 
policies, and North Korean problems. For China, the main frictions with the U.S. include arms 
sales to Taiwan; President Obama‟s meeting with Dalai Lama; U.S. joint military exercises with 
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Japan and South Korea in the Yellow Sea; and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
(Lawrence and Lum 2011). 
Though China has made great progress implementing reforms and opening to the outside 
world, China remains a highly centralized, authoritarian system. There is growing economic 
inequality between urban and rural areas. The main questions in China are whether its rapid 
growth would continue and whether the political system would be able to survive a future period 
of low growth.  There are also a lot of challenges for U.S. in many areas, such as economic 
development, job opportunities, and counterterrorism. Sino-American relations offer many 
opportunities for linkage politics to be practiced. In order to understand how linkage politics 
evolves, the work of other scholars must be examined in order to gain insight into the patterns of 
linkage. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
 Scholars have studied linkage politics in many different settings. According to Arthur 
Stein, linkage politics is “a state‟s policy of making its course of action concerning a given issue 
contingent upon another state‟s behavior in a different issue area” (Stein 1980, p. 62). This 
literature review will introduce some ideas and approaches that are useful for understanding 
linkage politics between the United States and China. 
Linkage, in the sense that one issue connects with another issue, is as old as politics itself. 
Politics in one place always relates to politics somewhere else. In the modern world, the amount 
of linkage in world politics has become greater. As technology shrinks the world and increases 
interdependence of nations, linkage phenomena cannot be ignored by scholars. The idea of 
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linkage is widely used in understanding the relation between national and international politics. 
Inquiries into the politics of foreign trade and so much research into the functioning of 
international organizations benefit from awareness of linkage phenomena. Linkage phenomena 
are important for political science because it has to explain the relations between the units it 
investigates and their environment (Li and Thomas 1975). 
  The study of linkage has several goals. One goal is to link the polity to its environment 
and to mark the boundaries between nations and the international system. Each country has 
different interests. Each country is strong and weak in different ways. These differences affect 
how linkage takes place. Another goal of study concerns the aspects of the international system, 
particularly institutions, with which polities become linked. Finally, the study of linkage reveals 
the important role that ideas can play as sources of issues within both national and international 
politics. 
By itself, linkage does not explain how political decisions and outcomes occur. As ties 
between nations multiply, linkages may exist between countries without one country having 
leverage over another country. Common forms of linkage include economic linkage, geopolitical 
linkage, social linkage, communication linkage, and transnational civil society linkage. (Levitsky 
and Way 2006). The fact of linkage produces a politics of linkage only when nations define their 
interests differently and encounter disagreement. Disagreement does not always mean that 
nations are competitors or enemies. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States 
used linkages between different issues to build cooperation with its allies and strengthen Atlantic 
relations (Wallace 1976). For many years the United States and China had very hostile relations. 
The two countries fought directly during the Korean War, and indirectly during the Vietnam War. 
Linkage between issues involved threats of punishment, not promises of rewards. Still, this is an 
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example of linkage politics. The fact that the United States and China have two very different 
political systems shows how important the relationship between domestic and international 
variables is for understanding linkage politics. Domestic politics in the two countries are so very 
different, so Americans and Chinese respond differently to the same incentive. The United States 
is democratic, China not so very much. The United States is rich, and China is still poor but 
growing quickly. Both Americans and Chinese understand this, and this awareness also becomes 
a part of linkage politics. Domestic politics in both countries can influence how linkage from 
national to international politics does, or does not, take place. (Lohmann 1997). 
Linkage politics is also influenced by private actors and both the domestic and 
international level. For example, in the United States international financial questions have been 
influenced by the role that American banks play in shaping policy. As Benjamin Cohen (1985) 
shows, big banks in the United States were heavy lenders to sovereign borrowers during the 
1980s. Banks participated in the process of making foreign policy, and they affected direct 
interstate relations and the foreign policy environment, and their effects altered the government‟s 
policy options and the issues of salience for policy. Bank decisions changed how foreign policy 
is implemented, even when banks had different priorities than governments. When sovereign 
borrowers could not pay back their loans to the banks, the interests of banks and governments 
split. The banks wanted to be paid, but the United States wanted to help the sovereign borrowers. 
This put constraints on American policy. The United States also wanted the sovereign borrowers 
to change their economic policies, and offered to influence the banks. In this way, the banks 
became an opportunity for American foreign policy. 
In U.S.-China relations, there are also many private actors that shape linkage politics. 
American companies want to export to China, and they lobby to keep trade open between the 
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two countries. During the 1990s, attempts by the U.S. Congress to link China‟s MFN status to 
human rights were opposed by American business interests (Cohen 2010). In the American 
bureaucracy, the State Department supported human rights but the Commerce Department 
supported free trade. In 1994 the Commerce Department‟s view won. Other American companies 
are hurt by imports from China, and they try to restrict trade. Some actors want the RMB to 
become weaker, while others want it to be stronger. American companies that have invested in 
production for export in China oppose protectionist measures against China, like the tire import 
restrictions of 2009. Chinese companies also seek export markets in the United States, and want 
to acquire technology from American companies. Other private actors like Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) want to influence American and Chinese policies about other issues, like 
human rights behavior and the status of Taiwan. These private actors are not motivated by 
economic gains, but they operate across national borders like companies. 
For linkage politics, the domestic and international context matters, as well as the type of 
actors involved. To explain decisionmaking, an important approach in political science is rational 
choice theory (also called game theory). Rational choice assumes that policymakers weigh the 
costs and benefits of each decision, and seek to maximize benefits. A country‟s foreign policy 
can be explained as a pattern of decisions in response to the rational behavior of decisionmakers 
in other countries (Stein 1980). 
From a rational choice view, linkage politics is a form of strategic interaction. If each 
actor always preferred to do what the other one wanted, then there is no conflict and each will 
obtain its best outcome without linkage. Only when an actor does not like an equilibrium 
outcome will a desire for linkage arise. The problem for the aggrieved actor is that it cannot 
change its own course of action simply, for an equilibrium outcome is one from which neither 
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actor can move alone without making itself worse off. So the actor who wants change must get 
the other actor to change its course of action. Linkage can make this change possible. 
According to Arthur Stein (1980), there are three different kinds of linkage: coerced 
linkage, threat-induced linkage and mutual linkage. Coerced linkage happens when the actor who 
wants change abandons its favored strategy and thus forces the other actor to change its behavior. 
For example, in 1956 the United States forced Great Britain to withdraw from the Suez Canal by 
stopping its support for the British Pound, even though the Americans usually defended the 
currency of its ally. Coerced linkage is easiest when one actor is much stronger than the other 
like the U.S. and Great Britain. 
Threat-induced linkage occurs when the actor wanting change threatens to abandon its 
favored strategy in order to force the other actor to change its behavior. To get the other actor to 
change behavior, the first actor threatens to (but does not actually) do what is against its own 
interest. Whether this works depends upon how credible the threat is. If the actor wanting change 
is stronger than the other, then the threat is more credible. But if the actor wanting change values 
its favored strategy too much, then threatening to change it will not be credible to the other actor. 
Even a weak actor may win over strong actor by behaving irrationally or pushing a situation out 
of control. For example, North Korea gains cooperation from the United States by threatening to 
attack South Korea. Also, if North Korea would collapse the chaos would threaten both South 
Korea and China. So North Korea wins by being weak.  
In the third kind of linkage, mutual linkage, both actors want a different outcome than the 
current equilibrium. Each actor wants to maximize its interests, but realizes that doing so would 
provoke the other actor to behave in ways that produce a worse mutual outcome. As a result, 
each actor avoids its preferred strategy in order to gain an outcome that is still better than no 
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cooperation at all. The most famous version of mutual linkage is called “Prisoners‟ Dilemma”, a 
strategic problem that is common in human behavior (Axelrod 1984).  In Prisoners‟ Dilemma, 
each actor wants to exploit the other (“defect”) while the other cooperates. But both actors know 
that if both defect, then the outcome is worse than if both had cooperated. Unlike coerced and 
threat-induced linkage, in this form of mutual linkage, each actor must give up its preferred 
strategy (defection) in order to gain the second-best benefits of cooperation. Otherwise, mutual 
defection produces worse results than cooperation or exploitation. 
Mutual linkage describes many situations where one actor does not have superior power 
over another. Prisoners‟ Dilemma can emerge in situations where there are more than two actors, 
and the benefits to cooperation are collective. According to Stein, “scholars have often noted that 
the basic problems of international economic order are those that result from a deficient 
equilibrium outcome in the prisoners‟ dilemma game” (1980, p. 79). For example, each country 
wants to trade freely in other countries‟ markets, while protecting its own. But free trade 
generally is preferable to protectionism generally. 
The rational choice approach also shows what makes linkage policies effective. To pursue 
successful linkage policies, an actor seeking change must understand the context of linkage, and 
what each actor‟s preferences are. The actor must be able to communicate its own preferences, 
and manipulate the preferences of other actors. The basic solution to prisoners‟ dilemma situation 
is to create mutual understandings of linkages across time. Robert Axelrod calls this the “shadow 
of the future”. In prisoners‟ dilemma, actors have an incentive to cooperate over the long term, 
but to defect if the interaction is brief. For example, the United States and China both gain from 
free trade over a long time. In the short run, however, free trade hurts companies in each country 
that lose markets. 
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Another way of gaining cooperation is to create mutual understandings of linkages across 
policy issues, or a “quid pro quo arrangement in which each player sacrifices on some issues in 
order to gain more on others” (McGinnis 1986, p. 142). The key to such linkage is that each actor 
concedes more on issues that it cares less about in order to gain more on issues that it considers 
of greater importance. The result may be patterns of cooperation that would not have existed had 
policy issues been treated separately. The theoretical and practical challenge is to recognize when 
attempts at issue linkage hurt cooperation rather than help it. For example, multilateral policies 
of free trade represent one of the most successful examples of linkage since World War II. The 
general benefits of global free trade have been achieved by countries balancing those general 
benefits against the particular harm free trade causes to certain domestic industries. Linkage 
politics within the broad issue of international trade have proven very successful (Davis 2004). 
Over time, tariff levels fell, and by 1995 the linkage politics of international trade resulted in the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet since then further progress in trade 
negotiations have stalled. The attempt by the Doha Round of trade negotiations to link 
agricultural, services, and intellectual property issues failed to produce an agreement (Bergsten 
2005). This happened partly because developing countries are stronger than they used to be and 
they resist rich countries‟ priorities (Yoo 2009). 
One of the most significant concepts developed by international relations scholars to 
explain cooperation is the idea of a “regime”. According to Stephen Krasner (1983), a regime 
consists of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. The concept is 
useful in explaining linkage politics because it seems to account for patterns of cooperation that 
persist even when the original circumstances that gave rise to the cooperation are gone (Keohane 
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1984). For example, the policy of international free trade arose after World War II when the 
United States was by far the most powerful nation. Now that the United States is not so 
influential compared to other countries, free trade still exists. Scholars argue that a “regime” 
exists in international trade that supports free trade. Countries accept that free trade is a benefit, 
and are willing to negotiate for free trade using principles and norms like reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination. The WTO provides rules and procedures that states can use to prevent 
exploitation by other states. In particular, when a country becomes a member of the WTO it 
gains Most Favored Nation status with all the other members of the group. 
Two features of the “regime” idea promote issue linkage. The first is that regimes bring 
different issues together so that states can make bargains with each other. For example, a country 
with low-cost labor like China can reach agreement with a country with high-cost labor like the 
United States to lower trade barriers if the trade regime also promotes negotiations over other 
economic topics like investment and intellectual property protection. The second feature of the 
regime idea is that it promotes certain ways of understanding issues. For example, when 
governments share understandings that free trade leads to better economies than trade 
protectionism, agreements to lower trade barriers become easier to make. The result is what 
Ernst B. Haas calls “cognitive convergence” (Haas 1980). Haas argues that shared 
understandings produce different kinds of linkage. “Tactical” linkage occurs when issues are 
brought together that have no coherence, and the linker simply seeks to gain leverage in one 
issue by bringing in another. American pressure on the British to withdraw from the Suez in 1956 
was an example of tactical linkage. “Fragmented” linkage occurs when all actors bargaining 
agree on an outcome, but not necessarily how to get to it. Agreements that involve such linkage 
may use side-payments to gain cooperation. The third form of linkage is “substantive”, meaning 
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that actors share understandings about both outcomes and means. Here, linkage will “proceed on 
the basis of cognitive developments based on consensual knowledge linked to an agreed social 
goal” (Haas 1980, p. 372). 
When a regime exists in an area of international cooperation, linkage will be less 
“tactical” and more “fragmented”. The strongest regime will show “substantive” linkage. For 
example, the regime governing nuclear non-proliferation is not so well established, since 
countries like India, Pakistan and North Korea violate the regime rules. To stop Iran from getting 
nuclear weapons, linkage is tactical. Economic sanctions and other pressure are placed on Iran. 
In the international trade regime, linkage is substantive because WTO members agree that free 
trade is good, and accept that the WTO provides for punishment if countries break free trade 
rules. “Cognitive convergence” means that countries share understandings of both proper ends 
and means to achieve free trade. 
Regimes are important for shaping how nations define and pursue their interests. As Haas 
(1980, p. 397) states, “regimes are norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate an 
issue-area. Norms tell us why states collaborate; rules tell what, substantively speaking, the 
collaboration is about; procedures answer the question of how the collaboration is to be carried 
out”. According to Robert Keohane (1984), regimes encourage linkages and side-payments 
within defined issue-areas. However, the emergence of regimes makes it more difficult to 
establish linkages between issues defined as governed by a regime with those issues outside the 
regime. Thus, “successful regimes organize issue-areas so that productive linkages (those that 
facilitate agreements consistent with the principles of the regime) are facilitated, while 
destructive linkages and bargains that are inconsistent with regime principles are discouraged” 
(92). Regimes promote more linkages, but narrower ones. 
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Scholars‟ work on linkage provides a framework for understanding how linkage politics 
between the United States and China has changed over the last three decades. Arthur Stein 
(1980) describes three kinds of linkage in terms of the power of the actors. Ernst Haas (1980) 
describes three kinds of linkage in terms of how much shared knowledge exists in an issue area. 
Combining the two sets of linkage makes a framework that is useful for understanding Sino-
American relations: 
TABLE 1 
Types of Linkage 




















 X  
Equal (“mutual”)   X 
 
This framework combines a realist focus on the power of actors with an interpretivist 
concern with how cognitive factors shape the possibilities of linkage. Boxes with “X” mark those 
combinations that are most congruent. For example, when power differences are great, linkages 
with low cognitive coherence (across unrelated issue areas) are likely. When relative power is not 
so unequal, linkages are more likely to involve compromises and side-payments. Finally, when 
relative power is equal, linkages are more likely to reflect “cognitive convergence” among 
actors. 
 Linkages outside of these boxes are possible, but logically unlikely. When shared 
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knowledge is high, coerced linkage is unnecessary. If, for example, a weak and a strong nation 
share understandings about an issue area (free trade), then linkage is governed by the rules of the 
regime which apply to both nations, and not by coercion. If nations of equal power practice 
“tactical” linkage (without cognitive coherence) across unrelated issues, then linkage becomes 
very difficult to sustain. “Mutual” linkage among equal powers creates prisoners‟ dilemma 
problems that require “cognitive convergence” to solve. 
Since re-establishing relations in the 1970s, linkage politics between the United States 
and China have evolved because of changes in the relative power of both countries (realist 
factors) and their understandings of issues (interpretivist factors). As China has become more 
powerful compared to the U.S., the U.S. cannot play the same linkage politics, especially about 
human rights. Linkage politics takes place within issue-areas, not across issue-areas. Also, as the 
Chinese economy becomes larger and more liberal, China accepts norms like free trade and 
intellectual property protection (Yee 2010). Globalization makes China a more responsible actor 
because it now has more to lose if globalization doesn‟t work (Zhu 2006). For example, after the 
financial crisis of 2008 China spent almost $600 billion, 15% of GDP, to stimulate the economy. 
This caused the Chinese economy to grow and helped the entire world economy (Cheok 2009). 
The U.S. and China had a shared understanding that fiscal stimulus would help the world 
economy and that free trade must continue. 
Using this framework, the thesis now turns to look at Sino-American linkage politics in 






IV. The Sino-American Currency Issue 
 China has held its currency fixed against the U.S. dollar for many years. From October 
1997 to July 2005, the official exchange rate was 8.28 RMB to the dollar. The currency 
appreciated to 6.83 RMB to the dollar between the summer of 2005 and late 2008, an 
appreciation of roughly 20 percent. Since then, the RMB has held steady against the dollar (Levy 
2010). 
More countries complain about the value of the RMB as China has played a more 
important role in the global economy. There is more and more trade between China and other 
countries, and currency affects the price of Chinese products for the other countries. Since the 
undervaluation of the RMB makes Chinese products much cheaper, China is able to export more. 
To keep the value of the RMB from rising, the Chinese government accumulates excess currency 
in the form of foreign exchange reserves. China invests its reserves, mostly U.S. Dollars, in U.S. 
Treasury debt (Levy 2010).  
In order to protect economic stability and investor confidence, China adopted its currency 
peg to the dollar, a policy that is practiced by a variety of other developing countries. Control 
over its currency value is an important element of China‟s economic strategy. As an “Asian 
Developmental State”, China seeks to exploit both its vast supply of cheap labor and its large 
domestic market for economic development (Gilpin 2001). Dropping the current currency policy 
could stimulate an economic crisis in China and damage its export industries. It would also 
increase inequalities between the urban areas and rural areas, with social instability as a result. 
From China‟s perspective, undervaluation of the RMB is a good policy. The Chinese believe that 
a fixed exchange rate is better than a flexible exchange rate for China because an appreciation of 
RMB would damage Chinese exports and industries (Lairson and Skidmore 2003). 
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One major uncertainty in this policy debate is that there is no agreement on how to 
measure the over- or undervaluation of a currency. There are two basic ways to estimate the 
RMB‟s undervaluation. One is based on Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates, and the other 
is based on Purchasing Power Parity (Morrison and Labonte 2011). The fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate is based on the belief that current account balances at the present are temporarily 
out of line with their real value. Estimating what the fundamental current account balance should 
be, one can calculate how much the exchange rate must change in value in order to achieve the 
adjustment. Purchasing power parity is the idea that the same basket of products should have the 
same price in two different countries. If they did not, then arbitragers could buy it in the cheaper 
country and sell it in the expensive country until the price disparity disappeared. For example, 
many business men buy products from China and sell them in the U.S., profiting from the price 
disparities between the two countries. If purchasing power parity is used to estimate whether the 
RMB is undervalued, then one needs to look at whether the same products in the two countries 
have the same price, taking into account the different standards of living (Morrison and Labonte 
2011).  
When the RMB is undervalued, Chinese exports to the United States are cheaper than 
they would be if the currency were freely traded. An undervalued currency also attracts foreign 
companies‟ attention to China as a destination for foreign investment in export-oriented 
production facilities, some of which comes from U.S. firms. But the RMB‟s undervaluation can‟t 
be sustained indefinitely because it makes the economy much more dependent on fixed 
investment and net exports for economic growth. It also makes imports more expensive and hurts 
Chinese consumers and some Chinese firms that import products from American companies. 
(Morrison and Labonte 2011). If the RMB is stronger, Chinese consumers would benefit because 
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imported products will be cheaper for them. 
The lower prices from the RMB‟s undervaluation improve the purchasing power of 
American consumers. The lower prices for U.S. firms of the imported inputs in their production 
also make such firms more competitive. On the other hand, lower priced goods from China may 
hurt U.S. industries that compete with those products from China, reducing the output of their 
production and affecting their employment. And the RMB‟s undervaluation makes U.S. exports 
to China more expensive, thus reducing U.S. exports to China and work opportunities for U.S. 
workers (Morrison and Labonte 2011). 
Since 1988, the U.S. Congress has required the Treasury to report twice a year on 
countries that might “manipulate” their currencies to gain unfair trade advantages. Manipulation 
is not defined by Congress, so the Treasury has discretion in deciding what it means. The Articles 
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommend that member nations avoid 
manipulating their exchange rates, but the IMF cannot force nations not to do so. If the U.S. 
Treasury calls China a currency manipulator, it means that Congress might authorize trade 
sanctions against China. It is unclear whether the rules of the WTO recognize currency 
“manipulation” as something for which WTO provides a remedy. China intervenes not to make 
the RMB cheaper, but to keep it from rising in value more quickly than it might. China also 
argues that it intervenes not to make the RMB cheaper, but to assure economic stability in China. 
Some Western economists also argue that the American trade deficit would exist even if China 
allowed the RMB to become more expensive. 
The U.S. has claimed in different international settings that China manipulates its 
currency, and that it should allow its currency to float freely in international markets. However, 
China argues that it must control its currency because it‟s important for the stability of the 
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Chinese market and trade. Whether or not the United States declares China is a currency 
manipulator, the U.S. demands that China stop its massive intervention. If China refuses, the 
United States threatens to impose a countervailing duty on Chinese exports. The U.S. Congress 
failed in 2010 to pass legislation requiring this punishment. The Treasury Department, and the 
Executive Branch, do not want to punish China. Instead, they want to negotiate bilaterally with 
China, or deal with the problem of currency values in a multilateral setting (Levy 2010). 
International institutions are not an important source of linkage in Sino-America currency 
relations. Because the WTO does not recognize currency values as a trade factor, the United 
States can‟t use the WTO‟s Dispute Settlement Body to punish the Chinese for currency 
manipulation.WTO is not an important institution to adjust the currency conflict between U.S. 
and China. The IMF has great expertise and its Articles of Agreement assign it a role in engaging 
with member countries to follow its rules on currency issues. However, the IMF‟s power to 
compel action on the part of a member is generally limited to loan conditionality. The IMF would 
be the appropriate institution under which to establish new norms for international financial 
behavior, if agreement on those norms could be reached. Since the end of Bretton Woods, the 
role the IMF plays in currency relations has changed. There is no longer an international 
monetary regime that organizes international monetary relations. Attempts to influence currency 
values are undertaken instead by major countries cooperating in settings like the Group of Seven 
during the 1980s (Levy 2010). While the IMF does recognize that the Chinese government 
intervenes in exchange markets to limit the appreciation of the Chinese currency, that 
international institution provides the United States with no way to pressure China. If China 
benefitted from IMF loans, then this would offer a pressure point for the U.S. to exploit. 
However China has no need of such loans. 
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Globalization also shapes the Sino-American currency issue. As China opens itself to the 
global market, the RMB begins to play a role in global exchanges that the Chinese cannot 
control. As China integrates into the world economy, China must allow the RMB to trade freely, 
and must open its capital markets to investors. This will also reduce the conflict between internal 
trade and external trade, encourage consumption, stimulate domestic demand, and reduce 
inflation. If the RMB could be traded freely, it may become important as an international reserve 
currency. The U.S. Dollar is still the world‟s major reserve currency, but this could change as 
China‟s role in the world economy becomes more important. Because the United States gains 
many benefits from the Dollar‟s reserve status, it knows that pushing the Chinese to revalue the 
RMB might make it a more truly international currency, thus reducing the Dollar‟s role. 
The currency issue in Sino-America relations directly affects the purchasing power for 
people in these two countries. A weak RMB increases Americans‟ ability to purchase imported 
Chinese goods and hurts China‟s ability to purchase products from the United States. A stronger 
RMB has the reverse effect. Employment is also linked with the currency in both U.S. and 
China. The value of the Chinese currency affects employment levels in both U.S. and China. 
When the RMB devalues, Chinese products will be cheaper and more Americans are willing to 
buy Chinese products, thus creating more jobs for Chinese people. When the RMB appreciates, 
Chinese products will be more expensive relative to American goods, encouraging American 
consumers to buy goods produced in their own country. This promotes employment in the 
American economy. But most of these American people who lost jobs are in the manufacturing 
sector, however, where the size of manufacturing employment is dependent on productivity 
growth, not imports from China, and there is a long-run trend that is moving U.S. production 
away from manufacturing and toward the service sector (Elwell 2004). U.S. employment in 
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manufacturing has fallen from 31.8% in 1960 to 22.4% in 1980, to 10.7% in 2005, to 10.5% in 
2006 (Lazear, Baicker and Slaughter 2007). This trend is not solely related to the Chinese 
currency issue. Rather, it is caused by changing technology and comparative advantage. 
Inflation and deflation also have a linkage with currency. The exchange rate could affect 
inflation in both U.S. and China, and inflation rates in turn could also affect the stability of 
currency. When the RMB appreciates, the price of Chinese goods will be more expensive in 
China, and American goods will be cheaper, thus reducing inflationary pressure in Chinese for 
American goods. But in the U.S., Chinese products will be more expensive, but they are still 
cheaper than American products, so it will also reduce consumer welfare because Chinese goods 
are more expensive than before but they are still cheaper than American goods, so American 
consumers will still choose to buy Chinese goods but they have to spend more to buy them. 
The U.S. and China use bilateral diplomacy through the Economic and Security Dialogue 
to address the currency controversy. The U.S. has tried to persuade China to reform its currency 
policy through such negotiation and other high level talks. In recent years, the United States 
Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, and the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates came to China to talk about RMB appreciation, and the minister of China, Wen Jiabao, 
also went to U.S. to reach a consensus with U.S. on the RMB issue. 
Americans point out that the RMB contributes to a big trade deficit for America. It‟s true 
that the level of the RMB contributes to the American trade deficit in the short- run. However, 
the trade deficit is related not so much to currency rates, but economic globalization. With 
globalization, the U.S. buys more and more products around the world. Yet many of the imported 
products from China are actually produced by American multinational companies in China, so 
American companies earn profits from these products. Half of China‟s exports come from 
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enterprises created by foreign direct investment (Cheok 2009). In addition, U.S. trade with China 
also benefits the American service sector, as and more and more American service companies 
(like UPS) benefit from access to the Chinese market. 
Ultimately, the trade imbalance between U.S. and China is not solely dependent on the 
Chinese currency, but on features of America‟s economic structure such as its large financial 
deficits and low saving rate. Moreover, the U.S. not only has a trade imbalance with China, but 
also with many other countries in the world. With increasing American FDI in China, those 
investors have an interest in maintaining the RMB‟s undervaluation. When the RMB is 
undervalued, the American investors will spend less than they expected which reduces their costs 
and attracts more American investment in China. From the perspective of international trade, 
U.S. and China have different areas of comparative advantage. Only when China imports more 
American advanced products will the trade deficit and imbalance be reduced. 
China has committed to making the currency more flexible in the near term and to 
eventually adopt a floating currency in the long run, but the reforms should be gradual in order to 
avoid disruptions to the economy. China also worries that if the RMB played a bigger role in 
global finance, then China might lose control over credit conditions and capital flows in and out 
of the country. Ultimately, China‟s currency policy serves as part of the country‟s economic 
development strategy. A low RMB subsidizes export industries at the expense of other sectors of 
the Chinese economy (Morrison and Labonte 2011).  
Because there is no international currency regime that creates shared understandings of 
what proper currency values should be, Sino-American currency relations cannot be dealt with in 
a multilateral context. The Chinese do intervene to keep the RMB lower than it otherwise would 
be, but there is no way of agreeing on where it should be. Exchange rates impact trade and 
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investment relations, but the WTO provides no forum for dealing with currency values, and the 
U.S. actually benefits in the investment area. A cheap RMB makes American investment in 
China easier. China‟s foreign reserves are also invested in U.S. government debt, so the cheap 
RMB that creates trade surpluses also helps funds the fiscal practices of the U.S. government. 
For these reasons it is difficult for the United States to practice linkage politics over 
currency values because the U.S. is vulnerable both in the short and the long term. In the short 
term the Americans need the Chinese to use their export earnings to purchase American debt. 
This allows the United States to finance its budget deficits. China owns about 25% of all 
American debt held outside of the United States. This gives China leverage. For example, in 
2009 when Treasury Secretary Geithner suggested that China was a currency “manipulator”, the 
Chinese retaliated by reducing their purchases of U.S. Government debt. In the long run, the 
United States needs China‟s support for the Dollar‟s status as an international reserve currency. 
However, a fall in the value of the Dollar hurts China‟s vast holdings of debt valued in Dollars. 
This encourages China to propose the expanded use of new forms of international money like the 
IMF‟s Special Drawing Rights (Zhiyue 2010). In the long run, if the U.S. Dollar loses its reserve 
status, America will be less able to borrow so much from the rest of the world. 
 
V. The Sino-American Trade Issue 
 
U.S.-China trade has experienced dramatic growth since the reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations and the signing of a bilateral trade agreement which provided mutual Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment. According to the statistics of the Chinese Customs, the value 
of Sino-US trade increased from US $ 12.88 million in 1972 to US $ 2.45 billion in 1979.  
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Between 1979, when the two countries established normal diplomatic relations, and l989, China's 
imports from and exports to the US annually grew by 15 per cent and 22 per cent respectively 
(Raman 2001). Trade between the two economies has continued to increase at a great rate and 
the U.S. remains one of China‟s major export markets. Chinese exports to the U.S. rose from 
$100 billion in 2000 to $338 billion in 2008, while imports rose from $16 billion to $71 billion. 
As living standards increase and a middle class emerges in China, economic growth has 
promoted the purchasing power of the Chinese people. China‟s growing economy, its large 
foreign exchange reserves, and its large population make it an enormous export and investment 
market for the United States. China needs export growth in order to maintain jobs for people and 
preserve social stability. As China continues to run current account surpluses by exporting to the 
U.S. and other advanced country markets, it has little alternative to buying U.S. treasuries with 
the reserves it accumulates while managing its exchange rate. If China does not buy treasuries 
from U.S., it will experience pressure from U.S. government. The U.S. needs willing buyers for 
the treasuries issued to finance its budget deficit, which has expanded greatly due to bailout and 
fiscal stimulus operations (Prasad 2009). 
In recent years, China has been one of the fastest-growing U.S. export markets. U.S. 
exports to China have increased two to three times as fast as U.S. exports to other major U.S. 
export markets. China is an important market for a broad range of American products, from 
agriculture, to manufacturing, to services. U.S. exports to China include both raw materials and 
high-tech products. For example, China is the largest market for American soybeans, which 
results in great profits for American farmers. In the manufacturing sector, China also buys a lot 
of more technologically advanced products from the U.S. such as commercial aircraft and 
automobiles. It remains the American government‟s policy to seek more export opportunities in 
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the Chinese market (Geithner 2010). 
Most products the U.S. imports from China are computers and parts, miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, communications equipment, apparel, and audio and video equipment. In 
recent years, U.S. also increased imports of more advanced technology products from China. But 
most of these products are the result of American multinational corporations in China or Sino-
American joint ventures. 
Trade with China benefits many American economic interests, such as consumers and 
those business interests engaged in import and export activities. However, some other U.S. 
groups, especially the domestic firms and workers that compete with low-cost imported Chinese 
products, experience losses, mainly because of cheaper Chinese products. This gives rise to trade 
conflicts between U.S. and China. 
U.S.-China trade relations have become strained for reasons beyond the size of the trade 
deficit. The U.S. contends that China has not fully met its WTO commitments, and provides 
inadequate protection for intellectual property. The United States has brought trade dispute cases 
against China in the WTO to try to resolve disagreements that could not be dealt with through 
negotiations, and China has also brought cases against the United States. For example, in 2009, 
the United States filed a case against China‟s export restrictions on raw materials. The United 
States charged that Chinese policies are intended to lower prices for Chinese firms and help them 
obtain an unfair competitive advantage. In the same year, China brought a WTO case against the 
United States because of its imposed additional duties on Chinese tires. (Zhiyue 2010).  
There has also been a chronic disagreement between the U.S. and China over the 
accuracy of each other's trade statistics. For example, according to Chinese Customs some years 
ago, the total value of bilateral trade was $ 74.47 billion with a trade surplus of $ 30 billion in 
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favor of China. But according to the U.S. State Department, the total value of the bilateral trade 
was $ 109 billion, with U.S. imports from China amounting to $ 94 billion and exports to China 
amounting to $ 15 billion, thus leaving a Chinese trade surplus of $79 billion. Chinese Customs 
figures reflect the value of only those goods exported from mainland China directly to the U.S., 
excluding those products sent to Hong Kong for re-export to the U.S, which are treated instead as 
exports to Hong Kong. The American figures, on the other hand, include the value of both 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong goods. However, U.S. export figures include only goods 
directly sent to China and not those sent to Hong Kong (Raman 2001).   
As noted in the previous section, many U.S. policymakers, labor organizations, and 
businesses charge that the Chinese government continues to manipulate its currency against the 
dollar in order to make Chinese products competitively cheaper. Because the WTO offers no 
forum for regulating currency values, WTO members like China and the United States cannot 
solve their disagreements this way. The exchange rate is only one factor affecting trade balances, 
and changes in it seldom have immediate effects. Even if China increased imports, US exports 
would not benefit immediately (Suominen 2010). 
Disputes over intellectual property rights also impact U.S.-China trade relations. Many 
American business companies contend that weak intellectual property rights protection in China 
damages their interests, and the United States has pressed China to improve its intellectual 
property rights protection regime. China has agreed to bring its intellectual property rights laws 
into compliance with the WTO‟s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
agreement, which commits members to protecting intellectual property. But the intellectual 
property rights problem still exists in the trade between U.S. and China. The protection of 
intellectual property rights was a difficult issue during the first trade negotiations in 1979, as the 
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Chinese negotiators were unfamiliar with the concept. Traditional communist attitudes towards 
intellectual work made it difficult for the Chinese to recognize its results as a form of property. 
Negotiations on the first Sino-American trade agreement stalled over the issue until China 
conceded some protection for patents and other intellectual properties. China began bringing its 
protections up to international standards by joining the Berne Convention and adopting the 
Uniform Commercial code in 1992. It also applied to join the Geneva Phonograms Convention 
(Tan 1990; Wang 1993). 
Bilateral and multilateral contacts are important for Sino-America trade relations. For 
example, in order to enhance the economic relations between the two countries, U.S. and China 
engage in high-level talks through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. This dialogue covers a 
range of economic and non-economic issues. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue is crucial to 
improve the economic relationship between U.S. and China. Maintaining high-level dialogues 
can help in building trust and a deeper awareness of how each side thinks. In particular, bilateral 
talks help each country understand the internal political dynamics of the other. (Prasad 2009). 
In addition to currency relations, U.S.-China trade issues also have an effect on 
investment. Financial flows between the two economies have increased but also become more 
lopsided over time, with bilateral foreign direct investment flows from the U.S. to China 
declining from $5.4 billion in 2002 to $2.7 billion in 2007 (Prasad 2009). Growing trade 
promotes financial ties because when people in the two countries do business with each other, 
they need financing from banks.  
The WTO is a crucial multilateral forum by which U.S. and China seek to manage their 
trade relations. From the perspective of linkage politics, the WTO is distinctive because it limits 
the ability of member nations to gain leverage on trade issues by linkage with non-trade issues, 
29 
 
and vice versa. An important point in Sino-American relations was reached in 1980, when the 
U.S. granted China Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Because China is a nonmarket economy, 
this status had to be renewed every year by American administrations because of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. If Congress does not like renewal, it can pass 
legislation against it. 
Before 2001, China was not a member of the WTO and dealt with U.S. trade relations 
bilaterally. Between1980 and 2000, when the U.S. granted China permanent status, the U.S. 
often linked trade with China to other issues. In exchange for renewing each year its MFN status, 
China had to bargain over other issues like human rights, Tibet, Taiwan, and nuclear 
nonproliferation. Domestic politics in the United States shaped these linkages. Democrats 
wanted to protect American jobs and promote human rights. Republicans wanted to protect 
Taiwan. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations always supported MFN renewal, but 
Congress was the place where opponents of China sought to link MFN status to other issues. 
Each year China faced pressure to make concessions to the Americans. Chinese found this 
humiliating and said it interfered with their independence and internal affairs. Trade became 
linked with non-economic issues. For example, in 1987 the U.S. restricted high technology 
exports to China in order to stop it from selling Silkworm missiles to Iran. After Tiananmen 
Square, the U.S. imposed trade sanctions and opposed World Bank loans to China. China 
supported Operation Desert Storm in 1990 to help keep its MFN status. China also cooperated 
with the U.S. over Cambodia and North Korea. Each year until 1994, China faced opposition in 
Congress that linked trade to other policy disputes. In his campaign in 1992, President-elect 
Clinton claimed that Bush was too nice to China. However, as trade with China became more 
important for the U.S., American business began to lobby for MFN status. After 1994 the Clinton 
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Administration did not emphasize human rights linkage. Instead, Clinton argued that free trade 
with China would encourage democratic reforms within China. Still, disputes over Taiwan in the 
late 1990s continued to link trade with foreign policy in U.S.-China relations (Cohen 2010). 
When China joined the WTO in 2001, U.S.-China trade relations changed. Because of the 
rules of the WTO, the United States could no longer link trade with China to other issues that 
were not related to trade. As Robert Keohane wrote about regimes, they encourage some linkages 
related to the regime but discourage linkages that aren‟t related. To join the WTO, China had to 
make many economic reforms. It had to lower trade barriers. China made concessions to the 
United States to gain approval of its WTO membership. But once China became a WTO 
member, trade disagreements are handled by the WTO dispute resolution process (Grimmett 
2010). The core ideas of the free trade regime are reciprocity and nondiscrimination. For 
example, China must treat all WTO members the same. Also, China cannot treat foreign 
companies differently than domestic companies. Under the trade regime that the WTO promotes, 
disputes are handled in a multilateral setting. This means that bilateral issue linkages that the 
U.S. Congress promoted in the 1990s are not possible anymore. Also, China‟s membership in the 
WTO has increased its economic power. Trade and investment expanded greatly. Until the 1990s, 
China valued access to the U.S. market more than the U.S. valued access to the Chinese market. 
During the Clinton era this changed, so American thinking changed. The United States values 
access to China‟s market too much to sacrifice it. Also, Chinese investment of its trade surplus in 
U.S. government debt gives the United States another reason to support free trade. 
The WTO does not cover all trade issues. For example, agriculture is excluded. So are 
services. Intellectual property protections are not strong. The Doha round of trade negotiations 
sought to include these issues under the WTO. Still, when the U.S. and China have trade 
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disagreements, they must work through the WTO. One effect of the WTO as a trade forum is that 
it shifts trade dispute resolution away from bargaining, where linkage strategies might be useful, 
and towards litigation according to WTO procedures. In 2007, the United States filed three cases 
in the WTO against China. The first case concerned export subsidies (USTR 2007). The U.S. 
contended that China was violating the Subsidies Agreement and National Treatment Principles 
by providing various tax rebates to Chinese firms. The second case involved intellectual property 
protection. The U.S. argued that China‟s threshold for establishing trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy was too high. The U.S. also argued that Chinese law lacked procedures and 
penalties. In a third case, the U.S. argued that China restricted film imports and limited foreign 
companies from distributing films and DVDs. The U.S. also complained that Chinese distributed 
simply copied the films of produced by American companies like Disney (Malawer 2007).  
As the U.S. sees it, China has not fully met its obligations as a member of the WTO. The 
USTR‟s ninth annual China WTO compliance report to Congress identified several problem 
areas. According to the report, China provided inadequate intellectual property protection. It 
pursued industrial policies and national standards that unfairly favored Chinese firms, and placed 
restrictions on trading and distribution by foreign companies. Finally, China‟s trade laws and 
regulations were characterized by a general lack of transparency. (USTR 2010). For example, in 
March 2006 the USTR filed a WTO complaint against China for its use of discriminatory 
regulations on imported auto parts, stating that the purpose of these rules was to discourage the 
use of imported parts and to encourage foreign production to relocate to China. In February 
2008, a WTO panel ruled that China‟s discriminatory tariff policy violates WTO rules on 
national treatment (Morrison 2011). 
The WTO has helped both U.S. and China solve many problems and conflicts in their 
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mutual trade relations. Within the WTO framework, U.S. and China have lowered trade barriers 
between the two countries. When China entered the WTO in 2001, China allowed the United 
States to treat it as a non-market economy for 12 years for U.S. safeguards. This has enabled the 
United States to impose restrictions on Chinese products in order to protect American domestic 
producers. For example, in April 2009 the United States International Trade Commission 
contended that tire imports from China hurt U.S. domestic producers. It recommended additional 
tariffs on Chinese tire imports and increased adjustment assistance to those producers and 
workers affected (Morrison 2011). The United Steelworkers argued that the tires from China had 
hurt the tire producers in the United States and contributed to the loss of tire-related jobs. In 
September 2009, President Obama announced that he would impose additional tariffs on certain 
Chinese tires for three years and these levels on tariffs were less than the USITC‟s 
recommendations (Morrison 2011). 
In Sino-America trade relations, there will always be some obstacles, but both countries 
have compelling reasons for continuing the relationship. There are some ways that both the U.S. 
and China can improve trade relations. In the past, the U.S. typically used unilateral sanctions to 
deal with trade conflicts with China, which placed stress upon the relations between the two 
countries. Both U.S. and China have used the WTO to deal with the conflict in trade, which 
reduces the likelihood of broken relations.  China is more likely to respect a ruling from a 
multilateral institution than to bow to bilateral pressure from the U.S. For its part, the U.S. can 
rely upon the multilateral pressure via the WTO to encourage China to open its markets further, 
since other WTO members have a stake in ensuring China's compliance with its WTO 
commitments.  




Since establishing normal diplomatic relationships in 1979, U.S.-China investment ties 
have become a significant part of their economic relationship. In 1980, just after U.S. and China 
established diplomatic relations, U.S. began its investment in China. Due to their lack of 
knowledge and experience, U.S. companies invested only tentatively at first. After 1990, as 
China pursued more investment friendly policies, more and more American enterprises entered 
the Chinese market and the American investment in China increased nearly 22 percent each year 
in the last decade of the 20
th
 century. After China joined the WTO, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows rose steadily each year (Davies 2010). By 2000, more than 300 enterprises that 
belonged to the Fortune Global 500 were invested in China. After 2005, the rate of American 
investment in China decreased, but American enterprises did not want to lose the Chinese market 
as more and more European companies came to China. American firms have adjusted their 
strategy to compete with other countries to maintain market share in China. 
China‟s investment in U.S. experienced three steps. The first step was to sell products 
made in China to the U.S. directly. The second step was to be listed on the American stock 
market to collect capital. The third step was direct investment in U.S. Some Chinese companies 
built factories or set up joint ventures with some other American companies. While there are 
many Chinese products sold in the U.S., few Chinese companies produce directly there. As a 
result, Chinese brands are not well known. 
China doesn‟t have any globally recognized brands and most Chinese companies just 
produce low-price products for the world. Chinese companies do not compete directly, and on 
the basis of quality, with the big foreign enterprises. Nonetheless, due to the vast buildup of 
China‟s foreign exchange balances, and international pressure to change its currency policies, 
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investing outside, especially in U.S. and buying some American companies is the best way for 
Chinese companies to succeed and achieve their aims.  
There are two kinds of investment from China to the U.S. The first is direct investment, 
when private Chinese companies invest in small U.S. companies. The second investment is from 
Chinese government or State-Own Enterprises (SOEs) to invest in or buy American companies 
(Owyang and Leong 2009). 
Chinese companies with low brand profiles invest in American companies to promote 
their brand recognition and establish a presence in the global market. In recent years, Chinese 
enterprises have entered the U.S. market faster and faster. As Chinese companies seek to expand 
and diversify investment in the U.S., the barriers from U.S. government to Chinese investment 
have become an issue in the bilateral relationship. One successful example of Chinese 
investment in the U.S. is the consumer products company Haier. The Chinese home appliance 
producer Haier Group built a factory in South Carolina in 1999 and entered into the US market 
(Tan 2010). Then, Haier established the Haier Holding Company, Haier Real Estate Ltd., Haier 
America Trading Company based in New York, as well as design, research and development 
centers elsewhere. Nearly all its employees are Americans. Another example of Chinese 
investment is from a mid-sized Chinese solar panel manufacturing company, DaSol Solar, which 
opened a small office in Washington, D.C., to look for business opportunities in the United 
States. 
In addition to private companies, Chinese SOEs want to invest in the U.S., and the 
Chinese government continues to adopt economic policies that encourage Chinese investment 
abroad. Most Chinese investment in the U.S. is from SOEs, while the government itself engages 
in portfolio investment. To balance the trade surplus with the U.S., Chinese government has to 
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buy the debt from American government. If China always holds its dollar reserves and does not 
use them, any fall in the value of the dollar will inflict losses on China‟s dollar holdings. 
Outward investment is a way to avoid these foreign exchange losses. Another reason why the 
Chinese government encourages outflows of money from China is to reduce pressure on the 
RMB and minimize inflation in China. Chinese SOEs encounter difficulties in pursuing foreign 
investments because the American government or some merchants will be anxious that their 
technology would be stolen by Chinese companies and Chinese investment will limit American 
autonomy, injure domestic industry, or even harm national security. So the American 
government often restricts these Chinese SOEs. For example, the state-owned China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) attempted to buy American oil company Unocal 
Corporation in 2005, but failed due to opposition from the American Congress, which doubted 
the motives of the Chinese company and argued that it did not represent a free-market 
transaction.  
Likewise, in 2007, Haier wanted to buy Maytag but failed because of American 
government opposition. Huawei is another case. Huawei tried to cooperate with the U.S. firm 
Bain Capital Partners to buy 3Com Corp, an American company that makes systems to protect 
against computer hackers. But U.S. refused Huawei‟s investment because of the company‟s 
alleged ties with the Chinese military (Davies 2010). There are also some cases of Chinese 
companies successfully acquiring American companies, like Lenovo. In 2005, Lenovo acquired 
the personal computer division of IBM with the consent of the American government. IBM is 
famous in the world, so the purchase helped Lenovo to enter the international market. 
WTO promotes investment between U.S. and China. Before China joined the WTO, there 
were many restrictions and problems in the U.S.-China relations, such as intellectual property 
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protection. Since China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China has 
worked hard to strengthen its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime, including the revision of 
major laws on patents, copyrights and trademarks in line with the requirements of the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreements of the WTO. WTO helps China to 
increase the share of the service sector, especially the financial industry. After joining the WTO, 
China has allowed foreign banks expand their investments and operations, including foreign 
currency services (Davies 2010). American banks, long limited to doing business in local 
currency with foreign companies, were allowed to conduct business in the local currency with 
Chinese enterprises beginning in December 2003. They gained access to RMB business with 
local individuals in December 2006 (Cohen 2010). 
U.S. foreign investment into China is only a small part of U.S. foreign investment 
worldwide. Before the 1990s, China did not permit foreign mergers and acquisitions, but after 
China joined the WTO, the U.S. increased its investment in China very quickly. American 
investment has been welcomed by the Chinese government because it brings new products and 
technologies. American companies will continue to invest in China to gain broader access to the 
Chinese consumer, and these American companies try to match China‟s needs and goals. For 
example, some years ago, China did not have a large market for nutrition products, so Amway 
came into China and expanded the market. When Amway just came to China, their way of 
selling met opposition from Chinese government. But after some negotiation, Amway agreed to 
support some Chinese initiatives like the 2008 Olympics, which helped Amway to open the 
Chinese door and built their large market in China. In addition, Amway tries to align its business 
culture with the Chinese market, with the aim of making the mainland its top market (Einhorn 
2010). Another example is investments by American cosmetic companies. Maybelline built its 
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factory and made products in China to lower its expenses and increase profit. Johnson & Johnson 
is another example. Johnson & Johnson acquired Beijing Dabao Cosmetics Co Ltd in 2008, 
giving Johnson & Johnson access to the broader market in China (Davies 2010). Some American 
delivery service companies have also come to China, like UPS. UPS has built its office in many 
cities in China, so it has a large business in China. Because of China‟s large labor supply, more 
favorable tax policies, and the potential market, American companies pay more and more 
attention to the Chinese market.  
However, many American do not trust the willingness of the Chinese government to fully 
implement its WTO commitments. As they see it, the corruption and local protectionism are still 
prevalent in China, and gaining the cooperation of local officials and government is a continuing 
problem (Morrison 2011). For example, the American investment firm, Goldman Sachs acquired 
Henan Luohe Shuanghui Industry successfully in 2007, but then failed to acquire Huiyuan Drink 
Industry because of interference from the Chinese government. At the same time, when some 
Chinese companies want to do business in U.S. directly, they will also encounter interference 
from the U.S. government. But over time, the government of the two countries will get together 
to reduce these obstacles for mutual benefit. 
Most investment is governed by bilateral agreements and treaties rather than multilateral 
agreements. China has pursued an active investment diplomacy since the last two decades of the 
20
th
 century, having signed 127 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) by 2010 and 112 double 
taxation agreements by 2009 (UNCTAD). The U.S. and China are attempting to negotiate a BIT 
to improve the investment climate and create more benefit for both countries. China seeks new 
investment outlets for its trade surpluses. For its part, the U.S. seeks ways of opening the big 
Chinese market of 1.3 billion consumers (Snarr 2010). A Sino-American agreement would 
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address investment protection, increase transparency, reinforce predictability in bilateral 
investment, and address concerns over potential investment barriers. 
U.S-China investment also impacts national security policy. National security is 
paramount for a country, and countries use national security as a reason for refusing investments 
from other countries. The failed attempt by CNOOC to purchase Unocal has already been noted. 
The Chinese enterprise Huawei Technologies Co. wanted to invest in the United States and 
purchased the American company 3Leaf, but the U.S. used a security review to refuse Chinese 
investment because they thought there might be some connection between Huawei and Chinese 
military (Davies 2010). China has realized the linkage of national security these years and also 
began to play this card with the U.S. in some fields of investment, like the internet. In 2010, 
Google suspended its investment in China for some time because of its opposition to Chinese 
censorship policies. 
Investment between U.S. and China always links to the market. The Chinese company 
Haier invested successfully in U.S., and the most important reason for its success is that Haier 
does much work on American market and it knows what kind of products have a large market 
and more consumers. Also, many American enterprises operate successfully in the Chinese 
market. General Motors (GM) is one example of this. GM knows that there is a big market for 
cars, so they invested in China and cooperated with some Chinese companies to build cars 
especially for the Chinese market. They not only opened the Chinese market but also made their 
brand widely recognized in China. Wal-Mart is another good case. Wal-Mart knows that China 
has a large population, and everyone needs to go to the supermarkets for shopping. So they 
invested and opened many shops in China, and in a short time, they built a big market and 
enlarged their business in China. Compared with some other supermarkets, Wal-Mart has a 
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bigger market and larger scale of consumers because it has many stores in different provinces in 
China. Moreover, Wal-Mart also has made e-commerce investments in China, like its investment 
in 360 buy.com and Yihaodian (Wee 2011). 
Sino-America investment is closely related to the labor market. When a country invests in 
another country, it will create many jobs for the local people. For example, when the Chinese 
enterprise Haier invested in South Carolina, most of its employees came from the local 
community. Similarly, when American enterprises invest in China, they will also create a lot of 
jobs and bring more opportunities for the local people. Chinese cheap labor is a factor that 
attracts American companies to invest in China. From a relatively small number of 
manufacturing affiliates in 1989, the U.S. multinational presence in China has grown to become 
a broader business community that now includes financial services and, more recently, industries 
that use high-skilled and high-wage workers (Burke 2000). 
Investment also influences the two nations‟ broader development policies. Each 
government will pursue policies that promote economic development, and some policies will 
affect investment a lot, like currency and tax policies. For example, if China keeps its currency 
low, it will reduce the cost of investment for foreign companies and attract more American 
investment to China, but this will increase the costs of Chinese investments in the U.S., and more 
Chinese investors will think about whether it‟s worthwhile investing in the U.S. So currency 
policies link with investment policies. Foreign tax policy is also crucial for investment. If the two 
countries reduce their taxes for foreign products, investment will easier, and more companies 
will be willing to invest in both countries. After China‟s open policy, the Chinese government 
reduced taxes for foreign investors, and this policy attracted many American companies and 
some other companies to invest in China. In the delta area in China, most foreign investors even 
40 
 
do not need to pay tax in some fields. The U.S. government has also relaxed its taxes on some 
Chinese companies, helping to reduce the costs of their investment. As a result, more and more 
Chinese companies invest in U.S. in recent years. 
Protectionism is another linkage in Sino-American trade. When China wants to buy some 
products from U.S. or sell some product to U.S., they often encounter the problem of 
protectionism. Also, when some American companies come to China, some Chinese people think 
they will bring a lot of competition to Chinese companies and gain too much from China, and 
some critics think they may also destroy some Chinese industries. For example, when some 
American food companies come to China, they take over many Chinese companies. Many 
Chinese people support protectionist policies for the same reason that Americans do. 
Investment flows between U.S. and China could strengthen many companies in both 
countries in globalization. When American companies invest in China, it means that they are not 
only gaining access to the Chinese market but also able to make their products much more 
cheaply and help them to sell more in many other countries. But if they did not invest in China, 
their products will not cheap enough for the customers in other countries to buy. When Chinese 
companies invest in the U.S., it also means that these companies come into global market and 
this will help them to strength their brands and to be more active in globalization. Chinese 
investments in the US are not always profitable. The Sovereign Wealth Fund lost over 50% of its 
$8 billion dollar investment in less than a year in the finance groups, Blackstone Group and 
Morgan Stanley (Petras 2011). 
 
 




In U.S.-China relations, the greatest challenge is the issue of Taiwan. Taiwan is the only 
issue over which disagreement or misunderstanding might lead to an outright military 
confrontation between the United States and China (Anderson 1999).  Thus, how China and the 
U.S. manage the issue of Taiwan has become central to the bilateral relations.  
After establishing the formal China-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1979, the U.S. has 
basically acted within the framework of the principles of the three China-U.S. joint 
communiqués. In these documents, the U.S. acknowledged that there was only one China, and 
that Taiwan belonged to it. At the same time, the U.S. affirmed its commitment to a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question, and to continued military support for Taiwan. In effect, the 
U.S. has deliberately assumed an ambiguous position in order to postpone any coercive 
resolution of the dispute. 
Relations between Taiwan and China are very complex, and have an obvious impact on 
the U.S.-China connection. The United States seeks to balance its obligations to the security of 
Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act with its commitments to China under the three 
communiqués. The U.S. wants to minimize Taiwan as a point of friction with China. However, 
the U.S. remains committed to a security relationship with Taiwan, which includes increased 
sales of arms despite objections from China. These arms sales are also likely to continue to 
include potential components of any eventual missile defense system (Anderson 1999). 
China‟s goal regarding Taiwan is reunification, while America‟s goal is to promote 
democracy abroad, so it makes uncertainty for both U.S and China on how to solve the Taiwan 
issue. This is perceived in China as directly threatening to the Chinese regime (Anderson 1999).  
As the Sino-American relationship becomes more important for the U.S., its old commitment to 
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Taiwan appears increasingly as an obstacle. China will more clearly express its will with respect 
to this question and pressure the American side to adhere to its previous agreements and give 
assurances that the U.S. will not allow an independence movement in Taiwan to damage U.S.-
China interests. Because U.S. needs the help and support of China in UN in some international 
issues, like North Korea and Iran, the U.S. is sensitive to Chinese concerns. 
In order to get economic and trade compromises from China and keep good relations with 
China, U.S. is willing to make some adjustment on arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. needs the 
support from China in many important international organizations and meetings, like WTO and 
Nuclear Safety Summit. For example, the White House announced that it would not sell F-16s to 
Taiwan so as to make sure that China would participate in the Nuclear Safety Summit in April, 
2010, and support American government.  
To get the support from U.S. on Taiwan issue, China also compromises on some other 
important issues with America, like human rights, currency, trade and nuclear proliferation. For 
example, in May, 2008, Chinese representatives agreed to increase market access, open financial 
sector to American investment, promote energy security, and strengthen the rule of law to 
America (Cohen 2010). All of these actions by China were contingent upon support from 
America on its Taiwan policy. 
Although official military-to-military relations between the United States and China did 
not begin until 1980, security cooperation between the United States and China started in 1971, 
with intelligence-sharing about Soviet military capabilities. Since then, the relationship has 
developed unevenly, with each side finding shifting rationales for cooperation. In 2001, the 
American Defense Department reassessed its military relations with China, which led to a 
decline in contacts. But the completion of the policy review and the holding of Defense 
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Consultative Talks in December 2002 has enabled these contacts to (Pollpeter 2004). Both the 
U.S. and China now recognize that the overcoming obstacles to better military relations require 
addressing not just specific problems, but the more general place of China in a global security 
context. Above all, the possibility of armed conflict between the United States and China forces 
both countries to cultivate a military relationship that will at least reduce misunderstandings. 
(Pollpeter 2004; Campbell and Weitz 2006). 
The Joint Statement published during Chinese President Hu Jintao‟s January 2011 visit to 
the United States affirmed that “a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is 
an essential part of President Obama‟s and President Hu‟s shared vision for a positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.”  Moreover, both sides agreed on “the 
need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and communication at all levels: to reduce 
misunderstanding, misperception, and miscalculation; to foster greater understanding and expand 
mutual interest; and to promote the healthy, stable, and reliable development of the military-to-
military relationship” (Glaser 2011). 
Security tensions have at times also affected trade relations between the two countries. 
When China has military cooperation or arms sales with other countries, it will attract U.S. 
attention. Chinese arms sales to Middle East countries, like the sales of anti-ship Silkworm 
missiles to Iran, and the missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan ran counter to American 
interests in the Middle East in the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, so the U.S. announced 
restrictions on high technology exports to China. But China wanted American technology, like 
the satellites produced by the Hughes Electronics Corporation, so China had to reduce its arms 
sales to the Middle East in order to buy high technology from America. For its part, when the 
U.S. engages in military maneuvers with other countries, it can offend Chinese sensibilities, and 
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thus affect trade relations with China. For example, the U.S. cooperated with Japan and South 
Korea to practice military exercises in 2010, which angered the Chinese. So the Chinese 
government bought more weapons from France instead of the U.S.  (Cohen 2010). 
But on the other side, the U.S. needs help from China to deal with a variety of 
international problems. China has cooperated with UN efforts to bring peace to Cambodia and 
has demonstrated increased willingness to share information about what was going on in North 
Korea. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, China supported U.S. efforts to mobilize an 
international coalition to counter the invasion. The U.S. government wanted the UN to impose 
sanctions on Iraq, requiring the support of the permanent members of the Security Council of the 
United Nations. The Chinese voted in favor of economic and political sanctions against Iraq. The 
Chinese could have easily obstructed America‟s response to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. China 
agreed to vote for UN sanctions including the use of force in exchange for the Chinese foreign 
minister being invited to the White House to meet with President Bush. Bush also obtained 
Qian‟s agreement to high-level discussion in Beijing on issue of human rights, trade, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Cohen 2010). 
Some nongovernmental organizations in the United States, such as Human Rights Watch, 
document China‟s human rights abuses. American official and private business interests have 
long argued that involvement in international trade leads over the long run to political 
liberalization in China. In this way, the U.S. has thought to deflect criticism of China‟s human 
rights record. While China may lack safeguards now, over time American economic interests 
would promote democracy in China and improve the human rights situation (Cohen 2010). 
Human rights, specifically the rights of workers, and the currency policies are not 
unrelated.  The labor force in China has no rights to organize independent labor unions, and 
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workers have no way to bargain with employers, which keeps Chinese wages low. In America, 
labor costs occupy nearly 50 percent in the total cost of production, but in China, the same figure 
is only 8 percent. Cheap labor reduces the cost of Chinese products and this contributes to the 
trade deficit between U.S. and China. The RMB‟s low level also gives Chinese exporters 
advantages in their business with the U.S., but Chinese workers have not shared in the benefits. 
In response to a surge in labor disputes and unrest, in 2010 the Chinese government approved 
substantial wage raises in many enterprises and cities. Some Chinese labor experts and official 
sources have expressed support for higher wages, a greater advocacy role for China‟s official 





Across the three policy areas of currency, trade, and investment, the question of the 
RMB‟s valuation is the key dispute that links the three areas together. Trade and investment are 
linked with each other. Investment could promote both import and export because it provides 
more products and job opportunities for trade, and trade also improves the opportunities and 
environment for investment. Foreign direct investment from U.S. to China increases imports 
from America and exports from China.  
Currency plays a key role in trade as well. A low exchange rate makes products cheaper 
and increases exports. When the RMB is undervalued, it makes Chinese products cheaper to 
Americans and increases exports for China, but decreases the exports from America. So currency 
is crucial in Sino-American trade, and American government tries to put pressure on China in 
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both bilateral and multilateral settings to change its currency policies. 
Currency links with investment in Sino-American relations. A depreciation of the RMB 
reduces the cost of Chinese labor, so it increases labor demand and employment, and attracts 
more investment from American enterprises. An appreciation the RMB could decrease the cost 
for Chinese investors who invest in America and encourage more Chinese investors to invest in 
U.S., but it increases the cost for American investors in China. 
China has accumulated vast amounts of dollars, thanks to its economic development 
strategy that engages with the global market, but uses the Chinese state to tip these terms of 
engagement in China‟s favor. In the thirty years since Sino-American relations have become 
normalized, two things have happened. First, China‟s economic growth has made it more able to 
resist American pressures, since the United States values the economic relationship as much as 
the Chinese do. Second, China has become a responsible member of the international 
community. It is represented on the U.N. Security Council. It is a member of the WTO since 
2001, unlike Russia. Over time, China has been successful in gaining membership in 
international institutions, even if there is dispute over how well China plays by the rules of those 
institutions. 
At the basis of the Sino-American relationship is mutual interest. After the Cold War, 
both U.S. and China began negotiating in hopes of a rapprochement. For China, a closer 
relationship with the U.S. provided China with a good counterbalance to the Soviets. The United 
States also wanted to increase its alignments against the Soviet Union. The rapprochement was 
symbolized by the historic visit of Nixon to China (Porter 2011). 
At first, the economic balance between the two countries was uneven. During 1980s to 
1990s, the United States pursued linkage policies with China that sought to change China‟s 
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behavior. The United States targeted China‟s human rights practices, its arms sales, and its policy 
towards Taiwan. The United States used economic leverage to pressure the Chinese. In 
particular, Sino-American relations were disrupted by the Tian'anmen event in 1989. The U.S. 
expressed its condemnation of human rights practices in China and suspended high-level official 
exchanges, and stopped weapons exports to China. The US also imposed a lot of economic 
sanctions to China. 
 As China established the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract more foreign capital, 
its economy grew rapidly. The economic balance shifted more towards China. Nowadays, U.S. is 
still the world‟s largest economy in the world, but China is growing even more quickly. As U.S. 
sees, China has used its growing economic to gain advantage in a number of areas, and China 
has also used its economic leverage to build partnerships with a number of advanced economies 
for its own success (Prasad 2011). In 2001, China became a member of WTO and agreed to open 
its markets to foreigners and attracted more investors. The U.S. and China also work on regional 
issues, like North Korea issue and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue is another form to promote the bilateral relations on economic and some 
other issues. 
Linkage means to establish a relationship making progress in one area dependent on, or 
affecting progress in another area between the two countries. In the course of Sino-American 
relations over thirty years, the nature of linkage has changed. During the period between 1980 
and 2000, the U.S. often used economic linkage to achieve non-economic policy goals because 
China was weak and had to adapt its policies to American preferences. But in the 21th century, 
this linkage is decreasingly effective. China is stronger and plays an important role in the 
international stage, and U.S. also needs the help and cooperation with China.  
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The United States promoted China‟s membership in the WTO as a way of making China 
a responsible member of the international community. American policy rests on the idea, since 
1994, that as China integrates into the world economy it will become more democratic so that 
human rights pressure will not be necessary. Now that China is a member of the WTO, linkage 
between trade issues and other issues becomes more difficult for the United States to practice. 
The multilateral nature of the international trade regime insulates China from policy leverage. If 
the U.S. disagrees with China‟s economic policies, it must complain through the WTO. But the 
WTO is limited because currency disputes and investment disputes cannot be solved through the 
WTO. Unlike international trade, there is no international regime that regulates currency and 
investment disputes (Spero and Hart 2010). 
The Sino-American relationship has become more evenly balanced, but their 
dependencies are deeper and more mutual than ever before. China needs the American market. 
The United States needs to export to China. China has huge supplies of U.S. dollars as a result of 
its export-driven growth. China has no choice but to invest its dollars in U.S. government debt. 
Thus China finances the American budget deficits, and has a stake in the fiscal stability of the 
United States. China cannot threaten to sell its portfolio of U.S. government debt without hurting 
itself. 
Adapting the earlier Stein-Haas linkage framework, the following table describes the 







Sino-American Currency, Trade, and Investments Linkages, 1980-2010 















































*Prior to 2005, the RMB/Dollar rate was pegged. Prior to 1994, the RMB was inconvertible. 
This table summarizes the evolution of linkage politics within the areas of trade, 
currency, and investment, with some reference to non-economic issues. Over time, as China has 
become more powerful and its position in global governance more secure, linkage politics, above 
all in the trade issue, have evolved to China‟s advantage. The leverage that the United States can 
exercise over China has declined as the scope for linkage has narrowed. 
While the U.S. and China will be both cooperators and competitors in the future, the 
influence of linkage upon China will decrease because China has joined most international 
organizations, like the WTO and G20, and now plays a more important role in the world than 
before. But linkage will still exist in Sino-American relations and will continue to affect the 
mutual policies in bilateral relations. 
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